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PURE QUANTUM INTERPRETATIONS ARE NOT VIABLE
I. SCHMELZER
Abstract. Pure interpretations of quantum theory, which throw away the
classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation without adding new structure
to its quantum part, are not viable. This is a consequence of a non-uniqueness
result for the canonical operators.
1. Introduction: The non-uniqueness of the canonical structure
In [1] we have proven two non-uniqueness theorems: For some fixed Hamilton
operator hˆ, we have constructed for some continuous parameter s different pairs
qˆ(s), pˆ(s) of canonical operators so that
(1) hˆ =
1
2m
pˆ(s)
2
+ V (qˆ(s), s)
with physically different, but equally nice (smooth, bounded, descreasing in infin-
ity) potentials V (q, s). In addition, we have constructed different tensor product
structures (or “decompositions into systems”) so that hˆ has an equally nice, but
physically different representation of type
(2) hˆ =
∑ 1
2mi
pˆi(s)
2 + V (qˆ(s), s)
in all or them.
From point of view of canonical quantization, there seems nothing problematic
with this result. It nicely corresponds to the standard way to define canonical
quantum theories: One has to define an irreducible representation of the canonical
operators pˆ, qˆ (with [pˆ, qˆ] = −i~) and then to define the Hamilton operator hˆ as a
function of these operators
(3) hˆ =
1
2m
pˆ2 + V (qˆ).
Once the theory is defined in such a way, no non-uniqueness problem appears – the
canonical operators pˆ, qˆ are those used in the definition of the canonical theory.
The situation is different if we consider interpretations of quantum theory. The
point is that the interpretation has to define the physical meaning not only for the
Hamilton operator hˆ, but for all physically relevant parts of the theory. Once dif-
ferent choices of s, thus, identifications of pˆ, qˆ with different pˆ(s), qˆ(s) would lead to
physically different theories (with different potentials V (q)), the operators pˆ, qˆ are
physically important, thus, the interpretation has to describe their physical mean-
ing too. In [1] we have already considered the consequences of these non-uniqueness
results for applications of decoherence in fundamental physics: The widely held be-
lief that decoherence allows to define the classical limit without additional structure
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has to be given up. We have also evaluated and rejected the idea to postulate some
fundamental decomposition into systems to derive a preferred basis. An emergent
configuration space Q would lead to a lot of losses (uncertainty, dependence on
dynamics) which are in no way compensated by gains in explanatory power.
The aim of this paper is to continue the consideration of the consequences of
these non-uniqueness theorems, in particular for various interpretations of quantum
theory.
First, we discuss and reject the proposal to embrace the different qˆ(s), pˆ(s) as
many different but equally real worlds – an idea close to but not identical with
“many worlds”. Once this proposal is rejected, an interpretation has to identify
the “correct” canonical operators qˆ, pˆ among the qˆ(s), pˆ(s). We argue that this
requires more than assigning pure labels. The canonical operators pˆ, qˆ are in some
sense different from the alternatives pˆ(s), qˆ(s), a difference which is not part of the
mathematical formalism of pure quantum theory and has to be defined by the inter-
pretation. This requires some additional physical structure which the interpretation
has to define.
Some interpretations have adequate structures – pilot wave theories [4, 5], Nel-
sonian stochastics [16] and physical collapse theories [11], [10] have a preferred
configuration space Q, and the Copenhagen interpretation associates the qˆ, pˆ with
classical measurement procedures. But there is a whole class of interpretations
which does not have such a structure – a class we name “pure interpretations”.
Such interpretations are the result of a very natural approach: One the one hand,
one wants to get rid of the uncertain, problematic “classical part” of the Copen-
hagen interpretation. One the other hand, one does not want to introduce addi-
tional structure into the theory. A reasonable minimalistic approach, and it would
be nice if it would work. But, as a consequence, the Copenhagen solution of our
non-uniqueness problem no longer works, and without any new structure no new
solution is available. Thus, this minimal, pure program fails.
We discuss shortly some important examples of such interpretations: Mermin’s
Ithaca interpretation [15], consistent histories [12], and the Everett interpretation
[9]. The aim is not to give a complete list of interpretations endangered by our
non-uniqueness result. While I think that the problem is sufficiently general, so
that every interpretation deserves a consideration if and how it solves this non-
uniqueness problem, this paper can be only a starting point. Our examples merely
illustrate that the problem appears in quite different approaches to the interpreta-
tion of quantum theory.
If interpretations which have a non-uniqueness problem will be given up or saved
by introducing some additional structure is a decision we of course have to leave
to the proponents of these interpretations. Only they can be expected to find the
optimal solution for their preferred interpretations. The point of this paper is to
clarify some general, common points – that, if one removes the classical part of the
Copenhagen interpretation, one has to introduce something else, a replacement.
This replacement has to be a non-trivial physical structure, which contains suffi-
cient additional information to identify the canonical operators. The identification
of the canonical operators with momentum and position measurements, which is
postulated in the Copenhagen interpretation, has to be derived now based on the
new physical structure.
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This fact alone already removes one of the main advantages of the Everett pro-
gram and similar programs. What can be obtained in this way is no longer a
pure, minimal interpretation, but only an interpretation with some additional struc-
ture. The question is no longer if an interpretation has some additional structure
(with automatic rejection of interpretations which have such “hidden variables”)
but what is the additional structure connected with a given interpretation, what
are their particular advantages and disadvantages (now with automatic rejection of
interpretations without such a structure).
The loss of purity is not the only possible consequence of the additional struc-
ture. Other questions may be influenced too. We consider two examples: First
the popular many world argument “[P]ilot-wave theories are parallel-universe the-
ories in a state of chronic denial” [8] becomes invalid if (as one would expect) the
additional structure introduced into many worlds is not part of pilot wave theory.
On the other hand, if we introduce one “preferred” consistent family of histories as
the additional structure into the consistent histories interpretation, this interpreta-
tion becomes more compatible with classical logic and realism, which would remove
some arguments against it. But there are lots of other problems to be considered
in future research. In particular, the symmetry properties of the theory may be
heavily influenced by an additional structure.
2. What is wrong with “many laws”
Anticipating a possible non-uniqueness of the construction of a preferred basis,
Saunders [17] has proposed a solution which avoids the introduction of new phys-
ical structure: One could accept the non-uniqueness and consider all the different
classical limits defined by different pˆ(s), qˆ(s) as equally real different worlds. Brown
and Wallace [7] describe this idea in the following words:
Suppose that there were several such decompositions, each support-
ing information-processing systems. Then the fact that we observe
one rather than another is a fact of purely local significance: we
happen to be information-processing systems in one set of decoher-
ent histories rather than another. [7]
This looks like a many-worlds-like solution of the problem. But it should be noted
that there is an essential difference between usual many worlds and this proposal.
The important point is that, as we have shown in [1], the different pˆ(s), qˆ(s) define
different physics. They have even different classical limits H(p, q, s) = 1
2m
p2 +
V (q, s). This situation is very different from the standard “many worlds”, where
all worlds follow the same physical laws, only with different initial values. We have
not only “many worlds”, but these many worlds follow different physical laws, a
situation which is better named “many laws”.
This difference allows some counterargumentation.
2.1. Loss of predictive power. The first one is based on Popper’s criterion of
empirical content. Its absolute version is that scientific, empirical theories should
be falsifiable, they should allow the derivation of testable predictions. But we need
the relative version, which allows to compare the empirical content of different
theories. If theory T1 makes at least one prediction which cannot be made by
theory T2, but all predictions of theory T2 are also predictions of theory T1, then
theory T1 has more predictive power, or higher empirical content in comparison
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with T12. Popper’s criterion tells us that the theories with higher empirical content
should be preferred.
Let’s apply this to our situation, and let’s compare the empirical content of a
single law theory (which has somehow fixed one value of s and chosen the corre-
sponding set of canonical operators pˆ, qˆ) with a many laws variant which embraces
all the pˆ(s), qˆ(s) as different really existing worlds. We have shown in [1] that the
physical predictions for at least some experiments depend on s. The single law
theory where s is fixed allows to make the usual predictions of canonical quantum
theory. The situation for the many laws version is different. This version cannot
exclude that the value of s in our universe is the same as that chosen by the single
law theory, simply because that single law is one of the possible many laws. There-
fore it is in principle impossible to falsify the many laws version without falsifying
the single law version.
In the other direction this is possible: The single law theory may be falsified
simply because the value of s is wrong. Because different s lead to different physical
predictions, it may happen in principle that we observe an effect as predicted for a
value s′ which is different from the s used in the single world theory. This would
falsify the single world theory. But if the correct value s′ of our universe is among
the allowed values in the many laws theory, many laws is not falsified by this
observation. So many laws theory remains unfalsified – the other, correct value s′
is allowed, it is simply the actual value of some other world.
Thus, the consideration of the predictive power gives a clear answer. A single
world theory has more predictive power, higher empirical content, is able to make
more specific predictions, and, therefore, has to be preferred following Popper’s
criterion. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the canonical operators pˆ,
qˆ of the theory are fixed and well-defined.
2.2. A symmetry argument. Let’s add a completely different argument, which
is based on symmetry. Once in the many laws version all worlds are equally real,
have the same ontological status, the physical properties of our particular world
cannot be further restricted by Ockham’s razor or further symmetry principles.
These principles allow to restrict only theories about what really exists. All the
really existing worlds are already on equal footing.
In this case, one would expect that the law of our actual universe should be a
typical, generic element of the set of laws. Indeed, if our observed law would be
a very special element, say, for the sake of the argument, the one having a special
value s = 0, then there would be no point of considering all the other laws. One
could simply use Ockham’s razor to cut all the laws with s 6= 0 out of the theory.
Is the law of our actual universe a typical, general element of the set of all
possible laws? This is something we cannot decide, given that we have considered
in [1] essentially only the one-dimensional case (a two-dimensional construction
was based on a product of the one-dimensional case), thus, don’t know nor the
real law of our universe, nor the possible modifications of it if we allow for other
choices of the canonical operators. But let’s nonetheless use the one-dimensional
case considered in [1], with Hamiltonians of type (1), as a toy model of the possible
laws for the universe, so that another choice of the canonical operators corresponds
to another choice of s in (1). What would be, in this toy-many-laws theory, the
analogon of the law of our universe? Given the important role of the potential
V (q) = 1/|q|, this potential seems to be the only reasonable candidate.
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Can the potential V (q) = 1/|q| be considered as a typical, generic element of
some class of potentials V (q, s) connected with each other by different choices of
the canonical operators? The answer is a clear no. The potential V (q) = 1/|q| can
be characterized among them by an extreme symmetry property.
To see this symmetry property we have to ask what changes if we change s in
terms of the eigenstates and eigenvalues of the Hamilton operator. The answer
is that the eigenvalues remain unchanged (the operator hˆ remains the same by
construction, as an abstract operator in the Hilbert space, and the eigenvalues Ek
are completely defined by the operator alone). The eigenstates |ψk〉 themself, as
abstract elements of the Hilbert space, remain unchanged too. But their positions
qk = 〈ψk|qˆ(s)|ψk〉 change, because they depend on the operator qˆ(s) which changes.
This change is not a simple common shift – this would be the result of a simple shift
in the potential V (q)→ V (q− q0). Different eigenstates obtain different shifts, and
explicit formulas for these shifts can be found from the theory of the KdV equation
[2].
Now, the positions of the energy eigenstates for V (q) = 1/|q| can we described
in a very simple way: they are simply all zero. Thus, in our toy model our universe
is distinguished by the very special symmetry property that ∀k qk = 0. This is
certainly not a generic element. It would need high conspiracy. Thus, we have (at
least for our toy model) a fine tuning problem: The “many laws” approach would
lead to the expectation that the qk are a quite arbitrary sequence of real numbers.
Instead, our choice of the potential leads to the very special case qk = 0 for all k.
For a theory with a single law this would be the most natural choice, clearly
preferred by Ockham’s razor. Instead, for a theory of may laws this is an extremal
property of our own universe which requires explanation.
2.2.1. But what about our real world? A natural objection is that our one-
dimensional toy consideration is much too trivial and our choice of the potential
V (q) = 1/|q| much too artificial to be relevant for our universe. So let’s try to find
out which part of the toy argument can be expected to generalize to a more gen-
eral, high-dimensional, realistic situation. First, of course, it remains unchanged
that the eigenstates Ek of hˆ remain unchanged. But once the eigenstates of hˆ are
unable to fix the position operator qˆ and the potential V (qˆ) already in the simplest
one-dimensional case, one would not expect that this changes in higher dimensions
(even if the nice exact mathematics of the Korteweg-de Vries equation works only
in the one-dimensional case). A modification of qˆ will also change the positions
of the eigenstates qk = 〈ψk|qˆ|ψk〉 of hˆ, since they obviously depend on qˆ. The
question is how reasonable it is to assume some symmetries like ∀k qk = 0. But
this is quite common already in the one-dimensional case. All we need in this case
is the discrete symmetry V (q) = V (−q). In this case, for an assumed asymmetric
eigenstate ψk(q) with qk 6= 0 ψk(−q) would be an eigenstate of the same energy Ek,
and then their symmetric and antisymmetric combinations ψ±(q) = ψk(q)±ψk(−q)
would define other eigenstates already with qk = 0, so that every eigenstate can
be represented as a linear combination of the same eigenvalue with qk = 0. (In
the one-dimensional case this would be even easier, because in this case there are
no degenerate eigenstates.) One can imagine that almost every symmetry which
acts nontrivially on qˆ (generalizing the qˆ → −qˆ of our example) may have similar
nontrivial consequences for the positions of the eigenstates. Given the large role of
symmetry in modern physics it seems quite reasonable to expect that there will be
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some symmetries in the final theory of everything too. Therefore the key elements
of our toy example seem to have at least a chance to carry over to the situation of
our real world.
2.2.2. Maybe the symmetry helps? But maybe the symmetry we have mentioned
here allows to solve the very problem? We prefer, of course, symmetric theories.
And, of course, if we have to choose between a symmetric theory and one without
symmetry we prefer the symmetric theory. But the very point of a “many laws”
theory is that the theory itself does not make such a choice. The “symmetric
theory” is, in this concept, not a separate symmetric theory, but only a particular
universe, with a particular law which has a particular symmetry. We do not have to
make a choice between theories – there is only one theory, which contains different
worlds with different laws. So, Ockham’s razor or human preferences for symmetric
theories are of no use here. A special symmetry of the laws of our particular universe
is something which requires explanation.
The situation becomes different if we reject the many laws proposal and want to
use this symmetry to find a preferred set of canonical operators. For this purpose,
symmetry properties of some choices of pˆ, qˆ may be useful, and we will clearly
prefer a more symmetric choice.
2.2.3. Maybe anthropic argumentation helps? The laws of our world may be not a
typical element in the set of all possible laws. Last but not least, our laws allow
the existence of human beings. Maybe anthropic considerations allow to fix the
parameters s so that no conspiracy is needed?
Now, anthropic arguments seem quite weak in their ability to restrict parameters.
The general picture, as defended, for example, by Weinberg [25], is that some
parameters may be restricted in some regions of the parameter space by anthropic
considerations, other parameters not. For some parameters may exist wide ranges
where anthropic considerations are irrelevant, because these parameters do not seem
to influence anything relevant for human existence. For example, the cosmological
constant Λ should be small enough to allow human existence. But if it is below
a certain limit Λ0, anthropic considerations are unable to tell anything. And if
|Λ| ≪ Λ0 the fine tuning problem is not solvable by anthropic considerations. For
other parameters, anthropic considerations may not exclude anything interesting.
For example, the mass of the top quark seems quite irrelevant for everything related
with humans. It could influence something only if it would be many orders lower
than it is. But nobody would observe any important difference if it would be many
orders greater than it is. Thus, the predictive properties of anthropic considerations
seem to be quite restricted.
Let’s see what would be required. The construction as given in [1] contains only
one parameter s, but can be easily extended to an infinite set of parameters {s2k+1}
where s = s3 is related with the KdV equation itself, s1 defines a simple shift, and
the other s2k+1 are related with other differential equations of order 2k+1, so-called
higher KdV equations (see, for example, [2]). And for each of these parameters we
have a similar situation: Different s2k+1 define different physics, with a different
potential V (q, s2k+1), changing the operators pˆ, qˆ, but leaving hˆ unchanged. Thus,
the non-uniqueness problem is a multi-dimensional one, all the parameters s2k+1
would have to be restricted. Similarly, if we consider, instead, the positions of the
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eigenstates qk as the parameters to be restricted to qk ≈ 0, we also have an infinite
set of parameters.
So, even if one can reasonably hope that anthropic considerations may restrict
a few of the s2k+1, or some of the qk, what would be the base for the hope that it
allows to restrict all of them?
2.3. Summary. We have here even two independent arguments against a “many
laws” proposal, of quite different character. A simple methodological one using
Popper’s criterion of empirical content and fine tuning argument based on the
thesis that our laws are more symmetric than the average laws in this construction.
If these two arguments are sufficient to convince proponents of this idea is another
question. Given that the proposal has been made by Saunders [17] in a situation
where the non-uniqueness construction of [1] was yet unknown, and that Tegmark
has proposed an even more radical version of Platonism where every imaginable
mathematical universe really exists [19], the idea to extend many worlds ruled by
a common law into many laws seems to be attractive to many worlders on its own
right, even without the necessity to solve the non-uniqueness problem.
But in the remaining part of this paper we will ignore the “many laws” possibility.
So in the following we assume that there is only a single law of physics, which makes
certain predictions. Thus, it follows from the experiment considered in [1] (which
proves that the different choices lead to different physical predictions) that the
complete description of physics consists not of hˆ alone but also of the canonical
operators pˆ, qˆ. The alternative choices pˆ(s), qˆ(s) are unphysical.
3. Pure interpretations: The minimal program for replacement of
Copenhagen
So, assume that we don’t want to embrace all pˆ(s), qˆ(s) as describing different
real worlds. There is only one pˆ, qˆ, which describes the true momentum and position
measurements, while all the other pˆ(s), qˆ(s) are only mathematical constructions
without any physical meaning. They may describe some other measurements, but
nobody knows which, and nobody cares.
But the pˆ, qˆ are not distinguished among the pˆ(s), qˆ(s) by their mathematical
properties. Each defines an irreducible representation of the canonical commutation
relations: [pˆ(s), qˆ(s)] = −i~. Each of them is connected with the Hamilton operator
hˆ in a quite similar way – the Hamilton operator has the same form (1), and the
potential V (q, s) has similar nice qualitative properties. But something in the
interpretation should tell us why we nonetheless have to use the operators pˆ, qˆ
(instead of one of the pˆ(s), qˆ(s)) if we want to measure the momentum or the
position.
In the Copenhagen interpretation this is done. We have the canonical operators
pˆ, qˆ. And these canonical operators are defined as describing the momentum and
position measurements. What do these phrases “momentum measurement” and
“position measurement” mean? The answer is contained in the classical part of the
Copenhagen interpretation. Or at least supposed to be. In fact, this classical part
is not formalized, and there seems to be no hope that such a notion as “momentum
measurement”, which covers lots of very different macroscopic measurement devices,
can be really made precise and certain.
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That’s why this “classial part” of the Copenhagen interpretation has been widely
considered as unsatisfactory, and has motivated attempts to get rid of it. The ideal
solution would be a derivation of the classical part from the quantum part taken
alone. The program to find an interpretation of this ideal type, which reject the
classical part of Copenhagen and start with the pure quantum part, without intro-
duction of additional structure, we call pure program, and the resulting interpreta-
tions (even if they are in fact not completely realized) pure interpretations.
The most popular example is the Everett interpretation (better named “Everett
program”), described by Everett in the following way:
“This paper proposes to regard pure wave mechanics . . . as a com-
plete theory. It postulates that a wave function that obeys a lin-
ear wave equation everywhere and at all times supplies a complete
mathematical model for every isolated physical system without ex-
ception. . . . The wave function is taken as the basic physical entity
with no a priori interpretation. Interpretation only comes after an
investigation of the logical structure of the theory. Here as always
the theory itself sets the framework for its interpretation. . . . The
new theory is not based on any radical departure from the con-
ventional one. The special postulates in the old theory which deal
with observation are omitted in the new theory. The altered theory
thereby acquires a new character. It has to be analyzed in and for
itself before any identification becomes possible between the quan-
tities of the theory and the properties of the world of experience.”
[9]
There are, of course, lots of variants of many worlds interpretations, and not all of
them follow the original pure program. But our point is, of course, not to criticize
non-pure variants of many worlds: Instead, our point is that the original, pure
program is not viable.
Many worlds is not the only such program. Another example is Mermin’s “Ithaca
interpretation” (also more appropriately named “Ithaca program”) [15]: On the
one hand, Mermin tells that “. . . I would like to have a quantum mechanics that
does not require the existence of a classical domain” and introduces as one of
the desiderata “The concept of measurement should play no fundamental role”.
On the other hand, we read that “. . . by quantum mechanics I mean quantum
mechanics as it is – not some other theory in which the time evolution is modified
by non-linear or stochastic terms, nor even the old theory augmented with some
new physical entities (like Bohmian particles) which supplement the conventional
formalism without altering any of its observable predictions.”
Thus, the basic idea of a pure quantum interpretation is shared by quite dif-
ferent approaches. But this is quite natural. The most questionable part of the
Copenhagen interpretation is its classical part, so it is natural that one wants to
get rid of it. On the other hand, one wants to minimize the number of assumptions
one has to make. And the minimum would be reached if nothing would be added.
Unfortunately, because these pure interpretations reject the classical domain of
the Copenhagen interpretation, the Copenhagen way to solve our non-uniqueness
problem has been lost. The “correct” operators pˆ and qˆ can no longer be distin-
guished among the pˆ(s), qˆ(s) by a postulated association with specific experimen-
tal arrangements described in classical language – this is part of what has been
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removed. On the other hand, once pure interpretations refuse to add some replace-
ment, some new, additional structure, they seem unable to compensate for the
loss.
Thus, the non-uniqueness result of [1] shows that the “pure program” – the
program to develop pure interpretations of quantum theories – cannot be realized
and has to be given up. If one removes the association of the canonical operators pˆ,
qˆ with certain measurement procedures, which is defined by the classical part of the
Copenhagen interpretation, one has to add something else, something which allows
to identify the pˆ, qˆ, in some other way with momentum and position measurements
we make. For this, the pˆ, qˆ have to have some special properties which distinguish
them from all the other pˆ(s), qˆ(s).
4. “Special” interpretations?
Let’s return now to the hope that some special symmetries of the problem may
be used to distinguish the pˆ, qˆ, by their special properties from the other pˆ(s),
qˆ(s). In our toy example this has been the property that all the positions of the
eigenstates qk = 〈ψk|qˆ|ψk〉 are zero.
Let’s note here an important and interesting difference between an imagined
interpretation based on such an idea and existing interpretations. Canonical quan-
tization works for arbitrary potentials V (q), and the Copenhagen interpretation
does not object and gives all these canonical quantum theories the same sort of
interpretation. But we can do canonical quantization for all the potentials V (q, s),
and the theory defined by hˆ as given by (1), and pˆ and qˆ as given by pˆ(s) and
qˆ(s) defines a realization of the canonical quantization for the potential V (q, s). If
an interpretation forgets now about the canonical operators pˆ, qˆ as defined by the
canonical quantization procedure, and makes a new choice of the pˆ, qˆ based some
mathematical properties of their relation to hˆ (like the property qk = 0) then we
do not recover in the classical limit the original theory we have canonically quan-
tized – with potential V (q, s) – but another one, with the potential V (q, s′) for the
preferred s′.
Thus, if we follow this strategy, we obtain a lot of changes in the general picture
of quantization: Only a few potentials, distinguished by some special properties,
allow to be quantized. Canonical quantization of other potentials gives, of course,
a canonical quantum theory as before, but the classical limit of this theory, as
described by an interpretation of this type, leads to a different classical theory
with different potential. For example, if we would use the property ∀k qk = 0,
the corresponding potentials would have the symmetry V (q) = V (−q), and only
potentials of this type could be obtained as a classical limit of quantum theories in
this interpretation.
This is not obviously false – essentially, to be viable, an interpretation should
be able to quantize only a single potential, the one we observe in our universe.
Then, such a restriction of the allowed potentials is a testable, falsifiable prediction,
also something nice. And if the potentials preferred by this interpretation have,
moreover, nice additional symmetry properties, as the V (q) = V (−q) symmetry of
our toy example, this gives the interpretation some advantage in beauty.
So this may be an interesting way to meet the non-uniqueness problem of [1].
But it does not meet the criteria of the “pure program”, because it adds new
physics, even important new physics, by restricting the class of potentials V (q)
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allowed in canonical quantum theories. Thus, an interpretation of this type is
physically very different from the Copenhagen interpretation (which does not make
any such restrictions). And, in particular, if we start with a canonical theory which
has a “wrong” potential, an interpretation of this type makes physical predictions
different from the Copenhagen interpretation.
Thus, the thesis in the title of our paper is not endangered by interpretations
of this type. Therefore we can ignore them in the remaining part of the paper
and focus our interest on interpretations which are not “special” in this sense,
interpretations which handle all potentials V (q) on equal foot.
5. The necessity of a new physical structure
That means, we assume that they allow canonical quantization for all sufficiently
well-behaved potentials V (q), and position and momentum measurements, as de-
scribed on the base of these interpretations, have some association with the canon-
ical operators. Note that in interpretations which do not contain the Copenhagen
classical part this association has to be derived, because it is no longer postulated.
And we assume that this derivation, whatever the potential V (q) used in the the-
ory, recovers at least approximately the Copenhagen association of the canonical
operators with the canonical measurements and recovers also the classical limit.
The point we want to make in this section is that this requires the introduction
of some additional physical structure.
5.1. Pure labels are not sufficient. The problem is that a canonical quantum
theory in itself gives only labels. There is some operator denoted pˆ with the label
“momentum operator”, some other operator denoted qˆ with the label “position
operator”, which form an irreducible representation of their commutation relations
[pˆ, qˆ] = −i~. The Hamilton operator hˆ has the form (3) with some potential V (q).
That’s all what is given by the canonical quantum theory itself.
Now let’s compare this with some other choice of s. We have now another
operator, denoted here pˆ’, which has now the label “momentum operator”, and
also another operator qˆ’ which has the label “position operator”. But in all other
aspects this is a standard canonical quantum theory. Thus, there is some (other)
potential V ′(q), but the general form of the Hamilton operator hˆ in terms of the
pˆ’, qˆ’ is the same canonical form (3). This other theory is simply equivalent to
standard canonical quantum theory for a different potential V ′(q).
But as a consequence of our assumptions, momentum and position measurements
for these two theories have to be different. In the first canonical theory, we obtain
the predictions for momentum and position for the potential V (q), in the second
theory those for the potential V ′(q). But the canonical theories themself have
distinguished the operators pˆ and qˆ only by giving them different labels. The
operator hˆ which defines the time evolution was the same, the operators pˆ and
qˆ define an unitarily equivalent representation of the same commutation relation
[pˆ, qˆ] = [pˆ′, qˆ′] = −i~. Pure labels don’t change anything. Thus, no physical
predictions should differ simply because we have decided to name pˆ’ instead of pˆ
the “momentum operator”.
Thus, there should be also something else which changes together with the label
“momentum operator”. Something physical, because it leads to differences in the
physical predictions, in particular for momentum measurements. There should be
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some connection between the label “momentum operator” and physics, a connec-
tion which is not covered by the mathematics of canonical quantum theories (that
means, by the irreducible representation of the canonical commutation relations
and the general form (3) of the Hamilton operator), but which allows to identify
the expectation value 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉 of the operator pˆ (the one with the label “momen-
tum operator”) with the expectation value of some real physical experiment which
measures momentum.
In the Copenhagen interpretation, such a connection exists – the association be-
tween the label “momentum operator” and the momentum measurement is simply
postulated in the classical part of this interpretation. Removing this part of the
Copenhagen interpretation would remove this association, reducing “momentum
operator” to a pure label without association to measurement procedures. But we
have to recover this association, because this is what the theory predicts. So there
should be something else, some physics defined by the interpretation, which allows
to establish such an association.
To clarify what is meant with a new physical structure, let’s consider a few
examples.
5.2. Theories of pilot wave type. With “theories of pilot wave type” we mean a
large number of quite different interpretations. First, there are of course de Broglie-
Bohm pilot wave theories [4, 5] with different choices of the configuration space.
But we include here also some stochastic theories like Bell-type field theories [3] and
Nelsonian stochastics [16]. To combine them all into a single class is justified only
because for the question discussed here their differences do not matter. They use,
essentially, the same type of additional physical structure – an explicit trajectory
q(t) ∈ Q in the configuration space Q. This trajectory may be deterministic in pilot
wave theories theories, stochastic in Nelsonian stochastics, and even discontinuous
stochastic in the case of discrete configuration spaces Q. But in all these theories we
have a new physical law, a variant of the “guiding equation” of pilot wave theory,
which defines the evolution of the configuration q(t).
Then it is postulated what our own state is described by the configuration q(t)
instead of the wave function ψ(q). This postulate allows to identify measurements
as something which has to change the physical state of our brain, thus, as something
which changes the value of some particular configuration variables qbrain(t). This
is a sufficient base for the development of a measurement theory. In particular, in
the classical limit we obtain the classical trajectory q(t) simply as the limit of the
quantum trajectory q(t).
The new physical structure, therefore, consists of the following elements: The
identification of the configuration space Q, or, in other words, of the operator qˆ,
a new equation for the evolution of q(t), and the identification of the state of the
universe with the configuration of the universe q. The canonical operator qˆ has
therefore a direct connection with the new structure, which does not exist for the
other qˆ(s). The canonical theory based on the other operator qˆ’ leads to a very
different pilot wave theory, with another configuration space Q′. The trajectory
q(t) of the first theory and the trajectory q′(t) of the second theory have nothing to
do with each other – we cannot even compare them because they live in different
spaces.
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5.3. Physical collapse theories. Another class of interpretations which have in-
troduced a new physical structure are physical collapse theories [11, 10]. In these
theories the new physics consists of a modification of the Schro¨dinger equation.
Some additional physical collapse mechanism disturbs the unitary Schro¨dinger evo-
lution and leads to a localization of the wave function. This localization happens
in the position representation ψ(q) ∈ L2(Q,C).
Given the collapse mechanism, we do not have to consider all wave functions
ψ(q) in the classical limit, but only a small subclass of localized wave functions
ψ(q, t) ≈ δ(q − q(t)) which are localized around the classical trajectory.
The new physical structure in these theories is defined by the terms which mod-
ify the Schro¨dinger equation. These terms depend on something which explicitly
depends on the canonical operator qˆ. Thus, the wave functions obtained in different
canonical quantum theories follow different equations, and the classical trajectories
q(t) ∈ Q and q′(t) ∈ Q′ approximating them have nothing to do with each other.
The author prefers theories of pilot wave type, considering de Broglie’s old ar-
gument that “[I]t seems a little paradoxical to construct a configuration space with
the coordinates of points which do not exist” [5] as sufficiently strong. But this
preference is irrelevant for the question considered in this paper. What is inter-
esting here is that above classes of theories have a sufficient additional physical
structure and therefore no non-uniqueness problem.
5.4. Predefined subsystems. In the previous examples, the configuration space
Q itself has already played a special physical role. But in principle the new structure
may be of a quite different type. A nice example to illustrate this is a predefined
subdivision H = HA ⊗HB of the Hilbert space into physically different subspaces,
for example into a bosonic and a fermionic part, as considered, for example, by Kent
[14]. Then we can apply techniques like decoherence or the Schmidt decomposition
to derive a preferred basis in one of them, defined, say, by some operator qˆA on
HA.
Here, the additional structure is defined by the subdivision H = HA ⊗HB itself
and the connection between the Hamilton operator and this subdivision. In the
simplest case, one could, for example, imagine a Hamilton operator
(4) hˆ =
1
2mA
pˆ2A +
1
2mB
pˆ2B + V (qˆA, qˆB)
which restricts observations of A made by the B-part to measurements of qˆA.
In [1] we have presented some arguments against interpretations of this type. But
these arguments are irrelevant for the point of this paper, which is that we need an
additional physical structure. This additional physical structure is present, and it
is also sufficient to identify the canonical operator, even if it is only the operator
qˆA of some part of the theory HA.
5.5. Summary: What we need. Thus, to solve the non-uniqueness problem,
we need an additional physical structure. The pure labels “position operator” and
“momentum operator” which remain if we remove the classical part of the Copen-
hagen interpretation (which have given them an explicit, even if only postulated,
connection with position and momentum measurements) are not sufficient. We
need something which gives different predictions for these measurements for differ-
ent choices of the canonical operators among the pˆ(s), qˆ(s).
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This requirement is not too strong, as we have seen in some examples of in-
terpretations which have such additional structures. To solve the non-uniqueness
problem, it is important that, first, we have an additional structure, and, second,
that this additional structure is sufficient to make a choice among the candidates
for the canonical operators pˆ(s), qˆ(s).
6. Consistent histories
And interesting example where the question if the additional structure is suffi-
cient is problematic is the “consistent histories interpretation”. An implicit refer-
ence to it we have already cited – our quote from Brown and Wallace [7] which
describes what we have named the “many laws” solution has used the language of
consistent histories. And this seems not to be an accident. It seems quite reason-
able to expect that in consistent histories different choices of s will be associated
with different consistent families of histories..
In its intentions, the “consistent histories interpretation” seems close to a pure
interpretation, despite the fact that it includes some additional structure. In par-
ticular, it rejects the classical Copenhagen part (“The interpretive scheme which
results is applicable to closed (isolated) quantum systems, . . . has no need for wave
function ‘collapse,’ makes no reference to processes of measurement (though it
can be used to analyze such processes) . . . ” [12]). What it adds to the quan-
tum formalism is “. . . an extension of the standard transition probability formula
of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics to certain situations, we call them ‘consis-
tent histories,’ in which it is possible to assign joint probability distributions to
events occurring at different times in a closed system without assuming that the
corresponding quantum operators commute.”
Is the additional structure added by consistent histories sufficient to identify
the canonical operators? The answer seems to be negative. Or, more accurate, I
see no reason for hope that the consistency condition for families alone allows to
distinguish between different standard quantum theories having the same standard
form
(5) hˆ =
1
2m
pˆ2 + V (qˆ)
only with different potentials V (qˆ, s). But this is what would have to happen if
the only thing added – the consistency condition for families – would allow to
distinguish between the different s.
Indeed, let’s look what we would need. We have a definition of histories, a
definition of families of histories, and some consistency conditions for these families.
What would solve the problem would be the identification of a history which has
a natural association with the canonical operators pˆ, qˆ. Now, histories are by
definition given only at some discrete times ti, and at each moment of time the
operators Eα(ti) defining the possible events have to commute. But these seem to
be purely technical complications. If there would be a consistent family of histories
(6) H = {Ojk(t0), Ojk(t1), . . . , Ojk(tn)}
where each event Ojk gives 〈pˆ〉 ≈ pj , 〈qˆ〉 ≈ qk with appropriate accuracy ∆p, ∆q,
one could consider this part of the problem as solved.
But the problem we want to solve is not simply that for one of the pˆ(s), qˆ(s)
such a consistent family should exist. The problem is that the structure added by
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the consistent histories approximation should identify a single s. It would not be
a very big problem if this is only an approximate identification modulo some ∆s
such that measurement results of the operators qˆ(s) cannot be distinguished from
each other. But some preferred s should be distinguished at least approximately.
What does it mean? If we forget a moment about hˆ, then all the canonical pairs
pˆ(s), qˆ(s) are unitarily equivalent (that’s how they have been constructed in [1]).
Thus, if there is a family of histories H associated with one pˆ, qˆ, we can simply
use this equivalence to construct families of histories Hs associated with every pˆ(s),
qˆ(s). The original H is consistent for the Hamilton operator hˆ. The question is if
the Hs are consistent. In principle, they may not – the question if Hs is consistent
given the Hamilton operator hˆ is unitarily equivalent to the question if the original
family H remains consistent if V (q) will be replaced by V (q, s).
Of course, the consistency of a family of histories depends on the Hamilton
operator. So, in principle, it may be possible that it among the V (q, s) there is
only one value of s such that the family H is consistent. But would you bet that
this will happen? I will certainly not. The V (q, s) are solutions of the Korteweg-de
Vries equation with s as the “time” parameter [1]. Their minima are localized at
very different positions q, but look qualitatively equally nice and have equally nice
formal properties (they are smooth, decrease at infinity) and even some important
properties like the eigenvalues of hˆ are the same. What could be a base for the
hope that a pure consistency requirement allows to prefer, among them, a single
value of s? I cannot see anything supporting such a hope.
So, if the additional structure which the consistent histories interpretation adds
to pure quantum theory is some variant of a consistency condition for families of
histories, there seems no reason to hope that the non-uniqueness problem may be
solved.
But is it possible to save consistent histories by adding more structure? This
seems not only possible, there is even a natural candidate – some preferred consis-
tent family of histories. The various criteria for consistency of families may have
different solutions, different families of histories which are consistent, nice and be-
atiful according to various criteria. But the different families are incompatible with
each other. If we hear different incompatible histories in everyday life, we believe at
most one of them, and even if we have not yet decided which story we believe, we
do not doubt that at most one of the stories can possibly be true. So all we have to
do is to apply this rule of common sense to consistent histories. That means there is
one consistent family which is correct, and everything incompatible with this family
of histories has to be rejected. Now, if this preferred family is somehow associated
with one set of canonical operators pˆ, qˆ but not with others, then everything is fine.
This hypothesis seems already quite natural.
Thus, while consistent histories as it is (with various consistency conditions, but
no definite choice of a preferred family of histories) seems unable to solve the non-
uniqueness problem, it probably may be solved by introducing a preferred family
of consistent histories.
7. Consequences of the loss of purity
Even if one accepts that one needs additional structure to solve the non-
uniqueness problem, one may decide that particular attempts to develop pure in-
terpretations have their own value and should not be given up, even if the initial
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hope to obtain a pure interpretation cannot be realized. This seems sociologically
plausible in particular for the Everett program.
What would be the consequences? Most importantly, the previously pure inter-
pretation would lose its most attractive property – its purity.
7.1. The fate of the denial-argument. An example of an application of purity is
the argument that “[P]ilot-wave theories are parallel-universe theories in a state of
chronic denial” [8]. This argument is quite popular in the many worlds community
[26, 6, 23]. Given the counterargumentation by Valentini [20], one would concede
far too much if one would accept this argument as somehow endangering pilot wave
theory, even if it remains popular among the many worlders [21].
But let’s nonetheless assume, simply for the sake of the argument, that the
argument in its original version is not completely invalid. Assume now that, to
meet our non-uniqueness argument, one introduces some additional structure into
many worlds. In this case, it is very probable that the argument becomes invalid,
for the simple reason that the new many worlds structure is not part of pilot wave
theory. Pilot wave theory already has an additional structure – the trajectory of
the configuration q(t) ∈ Q guided by the guiding equation – which distinguishs a
certain qˆ, thus, there is no reason to introduce anything else. But the argument
works only if all real, physical parts of the many worlds interpretation are also
real, physical parts of pilot wave theory and follow the same equations (like the
Schro¨dinger equation for the wave function).
Thus, the argument depends on the purity of the many worlds interpretation
relative to pilot wave theory: Everything which is physical in the Everett inter-
pretation should be physical in pilot wave theory too. If we save many worlds by
the introduction of some additional structure, the argument has to be reconsidered.
If the new structure is not part of pilot wave theory too, the argument becomes
invalid.
Of course, one cannot exclude completely that the many worlders use an addi-
tional structure which is also part of pilot wave theory, so that the denial-argument
survives. But this would be a rather strange choice. Last but not least, the addi-
tional structure is the configuration q(t) ∈ Q. This hidden variable is considered
as unnecessary today and does not seem to be the first candidate to be embraced
by the many worlds community. Even more, one could even question if a theory
which gives a q(t) ∈ Q the status of reality is yet correctly classified as “many
worlds” – it may be better characterized as a variant of pilot wave theory. It would
be much closer to the current many worlds approach if, instead, some fundamen-
tal “decomposition into systems” would be used as the additional structure. But
once no such “decomposition into systems” is part of pilot wave theory, the denial
argument would be dead in this case.
But this may be not the only loss. One of the major arguments in favour of
many worlds as well as of other pure interpretations is their claimed compatibility
with relativistic symmetry. 1 But whatever the additional structure, it may restrict
the symmetry group of the theory. In particular, the configuration space itself –
the structure defined by the operator qˆ we have to choose among the qˆ(s) – is (at
least in its usual form) not covariant. The danger that some additional structure
1 Given that a preferred frame allows a simple explanation of the SM fermions and gauge fields
in terms of a condensed matter model [18], relativistic symmetry does no longer seem to have the
fundamental importance which is attributed to it by the relativistic tradition.
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will destroy relativistic symmetry is recognized, for example, by Wallace, who notes
that “. . . there seems to be no relativistically covariant way to define a world . . . ”
[23].
7.2. Does consistent histories have to modify logic? On the other hand, the
loss of purity may also lead to improvements. The additional structure may destroy
arguments against the interpretation. Here, our proposal to introduce a preferred
family of histories into the consistent histories interpretation may be an example.
This is not only a possibility to solve the non-uniqueness problem, but removes
also another argument against consistent histories – that it modifies classical logic
without necessity.
The problem (discussed for example in [27]) is the incompatibility of different,
separately consistent, families of histories. A situation where we have different sets
of statements which are internally consistent but incompatible with each other is
quite common in everyday life – these are simply different incompatible theories.
Because they are incompatible with each other, at most one of them can be true.
And even if we do not have sufficient information to identify the true theory, if all
of them, taken separately, are compatible with all we know, it would not change
our certainty that at most one of the theories may be true. This is, essentially, the
whole point of logic.
But in consistent histories this everyday situation is interpreted in a completely
different way: “Note that incompatibility, the fact that the two families cannot be
combined, does not mean that one is ‘wrong’ and the other is ‘right.’ Seeking some
law of nature which ‘chooses’ one rather than the other is to misunderstand the na-
ture of quantum descriptions.” [13]. In other words, we have different incompatible
theories, but they are somehow all equally true.
The consistent historians are, of course, aware of the straightforward logical
consequence – if two theories which are incompatible with each other are above true,
one can construct contradictions. They have “solved” this problem by introducing
a new rule of logic – that one is not allowed to combine statements which belong to
different families: “Since both Fa and Fb are consistent families, the conclusions of
a probabilistic analysis applied using just one of them while disregarding the other
will be correct. However, the families are incompatible, and so these conclusions
cannot be combined. One cannot say that at time t2 the particle is both in a
superposition state c AND that it is moving on the upper trajectory u, for that
would be meaningless in the same way that ‘Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = +1/2’ makes
no sense.” [13].
This “solution” is not accepted as satisfactoy by the critics. It looks like there
are true statements A and B, but to combine them into the statement A AND B,
something which is always allowed in classical logic, appears to be forbidden. Is this
some sort of modification of the rules of logic, some variant of “quantum logic”? If
yes, then it seems extremely difficult to justify it. Even if the very foundations of
the scientific method, including the logic, are in principle open to discussion and
modification, the justification for a modification of logic should be extremely strong.
And, given that there are viable alternatives which do not require modifications of
logic, this does not seem to be the case. If classical logic is not changed, then what
is modified if the incompatibility of two families of statements does not mean that
at most one of them can be right?
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Whatever, all these problems with incompatibility simply vanish if we introduce,
as an additional physical structure, one consistent family of histories – the one which
contains the histories which are really possible. Thus, the additional structure which
seems necessary to solve the non-uniqueness problem would, by the way, solve also
another weak point of the consistent histories interpretation.
8. Discussion
We have argued that the only way to handle our non-uniqueness result is to make
a choice among the pˆ(s), qˆ(s), and to associate the preferred pˆ, qˆ with some physical
structure powerful enough to distinguish them as associated with momentum and
position measurements. This destroys the minimal program for the improvement of
the Copenhagen interpretation – to throw away the classical part of the Copenhagen
interpretation (which solves this non-uniqueness problem) without adding any new
physical structure to its quantum part. This “pure program” is unable to give
viable interpretations, interpretations which are able to solve our non-uniqueness
problem. A quantum interpretation which does not embrace the classical part of
the Copenhagen interpretation needs an additional physical structure.
It was not the aim of the paper to present a complete overview over all the
proposed interpretations of quantum theory whose viability is endangered in the
light of our non-uniqueness problem. We have presented some examples – the
Everett, Ithaca, and consistent histories interpretations. These examples illustrate
that the problem is relevant for quite different approaches to the foundations of
quantum theory.
But it was also not the aim of this paper to claim that the particular interpre-
tations we have considered cannot be saved. Instead, one can save them by adding
some new physical structure. Sometimes reasonable candidates are already part
of the mathematical apparatus, and giving them physical significance could even
improve them. We have argued that this in the case of consistent histories if one
introduces one consistent family of histories as preferred.
On the other hand, the introduction of an additional physical structure means
also some sort of loss. There is clearly a loss of purity. The interpretation becomes
in some sense more complicate. It possibly decreases the symmetry of the interpre-
tation and destroys some arguments in favour of it. We have discussed this for the
case of the “pilot wave theory is many worlds in a state of denial” argument.
The decision if the particular interpretations are worth to be saved, and what
are the best ways to save them, the optimal choices for the additional structure, is
something we leave to the proponents of these interpretations.
The interpretations preferred by the author – theories of pilot wave type which
have a physically preferred configuration space Q with a trajectory q(t) ∈ Q – do
not have any non-uniqueness problem. This means not only that the problem is
solvable and solved by other interpretations. It means also that what was a strong
argument against pilot wave theory – the existence of such an additional structure
– becomes now a strong argument in its favour.
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